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STUDY HABITS: PROBING MODERN
ATTEMPTS TO ASSESS MINORITY
OFFENDER DISPROPORTIONALITY
SHARON L. DAVIES*
I
INTRODUCTION
W. E. B. DuBois identified the problem of the twentieth century as “the
problem of the color line.”1  Writing at the turn of that century, nearly forty
years after the emancipation of the slaves, DuBois foresaw that the battle for
racial equality was far from over and was likely to demand the nation’s atten-
tion for yet another hundred years.  Although prescient, we now know that
DuBois’s figure was, if anything, sadly optimistic.  Near the close of the twenti-
eth century, despite significant gains achieved by the civil rights movement,
studies revealed the following: the country remained profoundly segregated by
race;2 African Americans were more likely than any other racial group to reside
in lower quality and prematurely depreciated housing located farther from job
opportunities;3 many of the nation’s minority youth were educated in largely
segregated and often overcrowded school systems afflicted by deteriorating
buildings, too few textbooks, scarce library resources, obsolete equipment, and
inadequately compensated faculties;4 and persons of color faced a significantly
higher probability of being arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated than did
whites.5  This article limits its focus to this last aspect of the continuing battle for
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1. W. E. B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1 (Candace Press 1996) (1903).
2. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 70–74 (1993)
(showing through block-level indices of residential segregation in thirty metropolitan centers that racial
segregation hovered around eighty percent in the North and seventy percent in the South).
3. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, The New Racism, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 55, 60 (Paul Wong ed., 1999) (citing studies).
4. See id.  at 62 (citing studies).
5. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 340–42 (3d ed. 1992); see also A
COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 457–58 (Gerald David Jaynes & Robin M.
Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) (reporting that between 1950 and 1978 the arrest rate for blacks jumped to
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racial justice in America, the problem of minority over-representation6 in crimi-
nal justice systems, and the ways in which scholars have tended to study (and
mis-study) the dimensions and complexities of that problem.
Three states—Oregon, Washington, and Utah—have recently taken empiri-
cal steps to assess the extent to which minorities are over-represented in their
respective criminal justice systems and to seek out the root causes of any over-
representation observed. The extent to which they failed or succeeded varies
dramatically.  This article contrasts and critiques the disparate analytical
approaches utilized by these three states and offers some thoughts about how
we might improve the chances of success of future similar efforts.  Part II sets
forth an overview of the state research groups’ objectives and the wide-ranging
questions they attempted to resolve.  To enable a more critical look at their dis-
parate study approaches, Part II also discusses the qualitative and quantitative
standards developed over time to help researchers avoid analytical error when
studying the minority over-representation problem.
Part III applies these conventional standards to the analyses conducted by
the three state research groups.  This discussion reveals that, despite the avail-
ability of a broad body of literature discussing problems of past research efforts
and advising researchers to take a uniform approach to the study of minority
offender over-representation, the three groups approached their tasks in
remarkably different ways, and two of the three state groups took analytical
steps widely discouraged in the literature.
Part IV shifts the focus from traditional standards of assessment to a more
theoretical look at the three state studies.  In this Part, I argue that all three
states shared certain theoretical assumptions which caused them to leave unex-
amined important aspects of the over-representation problem, and which more
broadly reflected the current legal tendency to search for signs of racial and
ethnic bias under the pointed white hoods of intentionally racist actors.
approximately 100 arrests for every 1000 blacks, while the arrest rate for whites was 35 arrests for every
1000 whites).  The disparity in the incarceration rates of whites and blacks was even more striking.
Over the course of three decades, blacks’ percentage of the nation’s inmate population increased from
29% (1950) to 38% (1960) to 47% (1980), a figure six times that of whites.  See A. J. WILLIAMS-
MYERS, DESTRUCTIVE IMPULSES: AN EXAMINATION OF AN AMERICAN SECRET IN RACE
RELATIONS: WHITE VIOLENCE 82 (1995).  A disturbing level of minority over-representation has also
been a feature of the juvenile justice system.  In the closing decade of the twentieth century, prevalence
studies of juvenile correctional facilities conducted in sixteen states revealed that African-American
youth had the highest prevalence rates in fifteen of the sixteen states studied, and that in 1995, although
minorities constituted only 32% of the nation’s youth population, they constituted approximately 68%
of juvenile population in secure correctional facilities and other institutional environments such as
training schools.  See MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 42 (1997).
6. Over-representation, as the term is used in this article, is defined as “a greater percentage of a
particular ethnic group within a community’s criminal justice population than that group’s percentage
within the community’s general population.” See MULTNOMAH COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY
COORDINATING COUNCIL WORKING GROUP ON MINORITY OVER-REPRESENTATION IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, ENSURING EQUITABLE TREATMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: ADDRESSING OVER-REPRESENTATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES i (2000)
[hereinafter OREGON].
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II
OVERVIEW OF THE STATES’ OBJECTIVES AND TRADITIONAL
PITFALLS OF SIMILAR ANALYTICAL EFFORTS
A. An Overview of the States’ Goals
The three state research groups enlisted members from a wide array of pro-
fessional, racial, and gendered backgrounds,7 and, although working independ-
ently, each agreed on the basic contours of a definition for the term “minority
over-representation.”  Over-representation existed, the states concurred, when-
ever the proportion of minorities processed through the criminal justice system
under study exceeded the proportion such groups represented in the general
population.8  This definition can be captured in the following simple equation:
percent of minority defendants in the criminal justice population
percent of minorities in the overall population9
Whether accepted ex ante as a given (as in Utah) or established after analy-
sis (as in Oregon and Washington), each of the states confirmed that the
number of minorities within their system did, in fact, out-pace the numbers of
minorities in their respective communities.  Each then attempted to determine
whether those racial and ethnic gaps were the result of discriminatory process-
ing decisions by decision-makers within the systems.  To this end, the states
asked a number of weighty questions related to over-representation.  Do white
and non-white offenders convicted of similar crimes receive similar or dissimilar
sentences?10  To the extent that dissimilarities in sentencing do exist, can they be
attributed to dissimilarities in the underlying criminal behavior of the sentenced
offenders?11  In an age of sentencing guidelines which simultaneously limit the
discretion of sentencing judges while conferring greater outcome-producing
power on prosecutors, can similarities or dissimilarities be detected in the
7. Judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, corrections officials, and leading members of minority
communities were common recruits.  See RODNEY L. ENGEN ET AL., WASHINGTON STATE MINORITY
AND JUSTICE COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON CHARGING AND SENTENCING
PROCESSES FOR DRUG OFFENDERS IN THREE COUNTIES OF WASHINGTON STATE 5, 105–07 (1999)
[hereinafter WASHINGTON I]; OREGON, supra note 6, at 106; UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL’S TASK
FORCE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM, RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS:
REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 2–5 (2000) [hereinafter
UTAH].
8. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 3; OREGON, supra note 6, at i; UTAH, supra note 7, at 19.
9. With sufficient data, this equation can be employed to assess over-representation at any impor-
tant processing point within a criminal justice system.  Thus, as a matter of theory, states would be able
to determine whether minorities are disproportionately subject to intrusive action by the police such as
stops, frisks, searches, citations, and arrests.  Similarly, the decisions of prosecutors to bring charges or
extend or withhold a plea bargain could be examined for signs of over-representation, as could the sen-
tencing decisions of judges and the supervisory decisions of parole officers and other corrections per-
sonnel.
10. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 5; OREGON, supra note 6, at 14.
11. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 51; OREGON, supra note 6, at 22.
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charging behavior of state prosecutors?12  Does the race or ethnicity of the
offender correlate with utilization or non-utilization of treatment-based alterna-
tives to incarceration?13  Does the lack of racial and ethnic diversity among pre-
sentence investigators contribute to racially-biased sentencing
recommendations?14  Is there agreement or disagreement between pre-sentence
investigators’ sentencing recommendations, applicable sentencing guidelines,
and actual sentences imposed?15  To the extent that disagreements among these
are found, are those disagreements correlated to race?16  Do race-neutral factors
that appear to influence charging or sentencing decisions have a disparate
impact on members of racial or ethnic groups?17
Each of the state research groups experienced significant obstacles resulting
from a lack of available data.  While all were stymied to a certain extent by this
problem, two of the three groups (Oregon and Washington) were able to gather
sufficient data to complete their desired analyses.  The remaining state (Utah),
however, gave up on its effort to collect the necessary data and consequently
doomed its chances of reaching any firm causal conclusions.
B. Traditional Empirical Safeguards for Empirical Assessments of the
Minority Over-Representation Problem
Before examining the reports more closely and comparing the successes and
failures the three states experienced, it may be helpful to consider the body of
literature that was available to guide the three research groups as they began
their study efforts.  Over the course of several decades, social science scholars
who have conducted similar analyses of minority offender over-representation
in various state systems have identified a number of flaws common to such
studies: 1) the adoption of an analytical model that focused on a single rather
than multiple decision-making stages in the justice process; 2) the construction
of a false dichotomy between “legal” and “extra-legal” variables to test the fair-
ness of minority disproportionality;18 3) the failure to incorporate multivariate as
well as bivariate analysis; and 4) the failure to include qualitative data in design
models.  Each of these study defects is discussed more fully below.
1. The Importance of Examining Multiple Decision Stages
One of the most common flaws identified in over-representation studies was
the tendency to analyze only one stage of the justice process at a time.  On the
whole, early research designers tended to focus somewhat myopically on a
single decision-point in a criminal justice system when attempting to determine
12. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 9, 23–30; OREGON, supra note 6, at 14.
13. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 30–34.
14. See UTAH, supra note 7, at 86.
15. Id. at 86–87.
16. See id.
17. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 20, 30–37.
18. See M. A. Bortner & Wornie L. Reed, The Preeminence of Process: An Example of Refocused
Justice Research, 66 SOC. SCI. Q. 413, 414 (1985).
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whether institutional players discriminated against offenders of color.19  Very
few explored multiple junctures in the criminal justice systems studied, and
those that did routinely failed to contemplate the fluid influence of decisions
made at various process-points.  The studies ignored the way in which decisions
made at early stages in the process had a tendency to flow forward and limit the
options available to decision-makers at later points.
Over time, critics began to call for a broadening of the analytical treatment
given to over-representation concerns.20  Social scientists were urged to trace the
entire journey of an offender through the justice process, beginning with the
decision to arrest, then moving through a series of critical adjudication decision
points (for example, detention decisions, the screening of referrals, decisions to
prosecute, and sentencing decisions), culminating with the decision of correc-
tional and parole personnel.21  Researchers who heeded this advice subsequently
confirmed the benefits of such an expanded approach.  Small or seemingly
insignificant race differentials observed at a single stage in the life of a case,
empirical scholars discovered, could turn out to be “quite substantial” when the
cumulative effect of those differentials at multiple processing points was taken
into account.22  Thus, future researchers were advised to look along the entire
spectrum of justice decisions for evidence of discriminatory decision-making in
order to avoid missing possible race effects.
2. The Legal and Extra-Legal Variable Distinction
Scholars who designed research models to probe the problem of minority
over-representation sometimes missed indirect race effects by including in their
models independent variables that unintentionally served as proxies for racial
or ethnic bias or masked earlier racial or ethnic discrimination within the
19. Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, The Influence of Race in Juvenile Justice Processing, 25
J. RES. IN CRIME DELINQ. 242, 243–44 (1988) [hereinafter Bishop & Frazier, Influence] (citing exam-
ples).  For example, some researchers probed only the sentencing decisions of judges respecting minor-
ity versus majority offenders as a means of testing the racial fairness of systemic decision-making, while
eschewing examination of the actions of earlier decision-makers in the system, such as prosecutors or
police officers.  See Bortner & Reed, supra note 18, at 414.  Others scrutinized racial disparities in pre-
trial detention or pre-trial release decisions to the exclusion of all else.  See id.  Still others chose to
analyze racial disparity at the stage of intake where the decision to proceed formally or informally was
made.  See id.
20. See, e.g., Ronald A. Farrell & Victoria Lynn Swigert, Prior Offense Record as a Self-Fulfilling
Prophecy, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 437 (1978); Allen E. Liska & Mark Tausig, Theoretical Interpretations
of Social Class and Racial Differentials in Legal Decision-Making for Juveniles, 20 SOC. Q. 197 (1979).
The point was perhaps most eloquently made in the juvenile justice realm by scholars like Professors
Bortner and Reed, whose work showed “the inadvisability of focusing exclusively on one juncture of a
complex decision-making process, especially final disposition.”  Bortner & Reed, supra note 18, at 421;
see also Bishop & Frazier, Influence, supra note 19, at 243.
21. See Bortner & Reed, supra note 18, at 421.
22. Bishop & Frazier, Influence, supra note 19, at 243, 258 (reviewing early studies of juvenile jus-
tice processing reflecting a tendency to conduct only single-stage analysis).  While this more holistic
approach was certainly an improvement, it failed to cure all of the ailments plaguing empirical assess-
ments of the disproportionate numbers of minorities processed into state correctional facilities.  As I
will argue in Part IV, the willingness to look at discrimination across a spectrum of decision-makers is
only as helpful as one’s definition of “discrimination” allows.
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system.  The work of Carl Pope and William Feyerherm, two leading social sci-
entists, provides an example of this easily missed flaw.23  After conducting a lit-
erature review of studies of the over-representation of minority youth within
juvenile justice systems, Pope and Feyerherm noted that researchers who had
found no evidence of discrimination by criminal justice personnel (roughly one-
third of the studies they reviewed) had included control variables in their design
models such as the offender’s “family composition,” “stability” of the offender’s
family, or even prior criminal history, all of which could mask stereotypical
decision-making or prior discrimination.24
Studies have suggested that even if judges, prosecutors, and probation per-
sonnel are not directly influenced by racial animus, their decisions and recom-
mendations may nevertheless be indirectly influenced by racial or ethnic con-
siderations.  For example, in many systems justice officials make
recommendations or decisions based in part on their perceptions of offenders’
family circumstances.  25  Thus, a judge’s pre-trial detention decision may be
affected by the judge’s perception of whether an offender’s family is capable of
providing sufficient supervision or support during the period of pre-trial release.
If the judge perceives that the family is unlikely to provide a constructive envi-
ronment for the offender, she may be more likely to order the offender
detained.  While, at first glance, this may appear to be an objective, race-neutral
determination, it may actually obscure significant race effects if minority fami-
lies are “generally perceived in a more negative light.”26  This is particularly true
in light of findings that pre-trial detention orders may themselves be signifi-
cantly correlated with negative case outcomes.  For this reason, Pope and Fey-
erherm warned their readers that an unreflective use of such variables could
lead to flawed conclusions:
[C]ontrolling for such variables appears to reduce the difference in treatment accorded
to white and minority youths.  However, logically, what has occurred in these studies is
the identification of the mechanism by which differences between white and minority
youths are created.  Whether these type[s] of variables ought to be used in justice
system decision-making, and whether they ought to produce the degree of difference
between white and minority youths that they appear to produce are issues that must
be addressed.27
Put slightly differently, while it may be instructive to discover that offenders
from families perceived to be less “stable” than the norm—such as those
headed by a single parent—are treated more harshly than other offenders, such
a finding cannot inexorably lead to the conclusion that the offender has not
23. See Carl E. Pope & William H. Feyerherm, Minority Status and Juvenile Justice Processing: An
Assessment of the Research Literature, 22 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 327 (1990).
24. Id. at 334–35.
25. See, e.g., Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-
Making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392, 409 (1996) [hereinafter
Bishop & Frazier, Race Effects] (reporting results of interviews with justice personnel reflecting a
shared perception that minority youths were disproportionately detained due to the reality of  inade-
quate family structures, rather than race or ethnicity).
26. Id.
27. Pope & Feyerherm, supra note 23, at 334–35 (emphasis added).
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been racially or ethnically discriminated against.  It does, however, expose the
unnaturally constricted way in which certain researchers use the term “discrimi-
nation.”
A related methodological concern about the proper use of independent
variables sometimes discussed in the literature involves the unreflective way in
which some researchers perceive the “legal” and “extra-legal” variables most
commonly included in design models.  Some scholars tend to assume that
“legal” variables are invariably objective and race-neutral.  Under such an
approach, if a study shows a statistically significant correlation between an
offender’s prior criminal history and subsequent case disposition, the result will
be considered unobjectionable.  Conversely, offender treatment or outcomes
shown to have been affected by certain “extra-legal” variables such as race,
ethnicity, and gender were thought indefensible.  The implication of this
approach is that legal and extra-legal variables are both separable from and
unrelated to each other, even though an ostensibly objective legal variable, such
as an offender’s prior record, might itself have been tainted by the offender’s
race, gender, or class.28  The failure to reflect adequately about the possible
influence of race or ethnicity (or other purportedly race-neutral variables) in
the creation of an offender’s prior record is a flaw common to the vast majority
of empirical studies of minority offender disproportionality.
3. The Importance of Multivariate Assessment
In addition to the foregoing analytical concerns, early over-representation
researchers sometimes employed inadequate controls for variables that might
help to explain observed race differentials.  Further, they sometimes relied
exclusively on bivariate analyses which made it impossible to determine
whether an offender’s race or some other theoretically relevant variable
affected his or her processing outcome.29  Quantitative analysts avoid these dif-
ficulties today by employing multivariate models that enable them to explore
the interaction effects of a number of variables and to offer more nuanced
explanations for observed racial differentials.  Thus, a contemporary multivari-
ate model utilized in the over-representation context will typically include con-
trols for an offender’s prior offense history and the seriousness of the charge
pending against her30 to determine whether over-representation could be
explained by “race-neutral” factors.31  Social variables such as gender and age
28. See, e.g., John Hagan et al., Ceremonial Justice: Crime and Punishment in a Loosely Coupled
System, 58 SOC. FORCES 506 (1979).
29. Simple examples of bivariate assessments might include the examination by race of the number
of criminal suspects who are arrested versus the number allowed to voluntarily surrender, the number
of criminal offenders ordered detained prior to trial versus released on bail, and the number of offend-
ers sentenced to incarceration versus placed on probation.
30. See, e.g., Bishop & Frazier, Influence, supra note 19, at 245.
31. I am using the term “race-neutral” loosely here purely as a way to describe the analytical proc-
ess believed to produce the most accurate and defensible empirical conclusions.  These ostensibly inde-
pendent variables may be anything but race-neutral if they are themselves tainted by intentional or
unintentional racial bias.  See Pope & Feyerhorn, supra note 23, at 334–35.
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are also typically included.  Other multivariate models include additional social
factors such as the offender’s socio-economic status, family structure, and
school performance.32
4. The Importance of Complimentary Qualitative Assessment
In addition to the need for careful analysis of quantitative data, researchers
have long noted that qualitative information should be gathered and assessed to
illuminate the social and political context from which the quantitative data is
drawn.  It is urged that only with a clear appreciation of the surrounding context
may quantitative data fully be understood.
To illustrate this point, suppose that a study reveals through quantitative
data alone that during a particular time period significantly more minority pro-
bationers were ordered confined for failing to meet with their probation officers
than non-minority probationers residing in the same jurisdiction.  In the
absence of qualitative data to understand this probation-breaking statistic, the
quantitative data could be used to explain and justify both the judicial orders
and the higher incarceration rates.  The data would seem to suggest that minor-
ity offenders were simply less responsible about abiding by the terms of their
conditions of probation.  If this was the whole story, the revocation of their
grants of probation might appear entirely appropriate.
The addition of qualitative information to the study, however, could lead to
a more complete understanding of the probation-breaking behavior.  For
example, interviews with probation officers or a closer review of case files might
show that significantly more minority than non-minority probationers lived in
neighborhoods located significantly farther away from the offices of their pro-
bation officers.  It might also be discovered that they lacked adequate transpor-
tation to and from those meetings.  This additional information, obtainable only
through qualitative data-gathering efforts, raises the possibility that the proba-
tioners’ non-compliant behavior could be due to structural barriers rather than
a lack of responsibility among minority offenders.
III
THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DESIGNS EMPLOYED
The foregoing insights provide a helpful framework against which to begin
to assess whether the methodologies employed by the three state research
groups included sufficient quantitative and qualitative safeguards to ensure reli-
able results.  On the quantitative front, I looked at each of the reports to deter-
mine whether the state statistical model included data that examined a single
leg of the case processing system for racial effects or data that tracked a crimi-
nal case from arrest to final disposition.  If the report examined multiple deci-
sion points, I then asked how comprehensive the decision points considered
32. See, e.g., Madeline Wordes et al., Locking Up Youth: The Impact of Race on Detention Deci-
sions, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 149 (1994).
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were relative to the critical judgments made in a typical criminal case.  To
determine the qualitative strengths and weaknesses of the three state analytical
instruments, I reviewed each of the design models to determine whether it
employed traditional qualitative methodologies, such as public hearings, per-
sonal interviews, survey instruments, and case record reviews, to enable a fuller
understanding of the quantitative evidence.  Finally, I scrutinized the states’ sta-
tistical models for evidence of failure to consider the indirect effects of race on
chosen variables and their use of multivariate as well as bivariate analysis.
As described more fully below, Utah, Oregon, and Washington each under-
took assessments of the over-representation problem, albeit with decidedly
mixed results.  All three of the state assessments studied data reflecting official
action in or around the same time period, ranging from 1998 to 2000.33  The
research groups focused primarily on the same racial and ethnic groups,34
although the groupings were not identical.35  The number of cases examined in
each study ranged from a high of 42,503 (Oregon) to a mid-range of 294
(Washington) to a low of virtually zero (Utah).36  Each state employed a similar
approach to data collection37 and reported experiencing data collection prob-
lems, in varying degrees.38
33. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 19, 47 (data collected between 1998 and 1999); OREGON,
supra note 6, at 1 (study commissioned in June 1998 with almost all data from 1998); UTAH, supra note
7, at 17, 36 (study commissioned in 1996 with research completed in June 2000).
34. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 47 (white (non-Hispanic), African American, and His-
panic); OREGON, supra note 6, at 1 n.3 (white, African American, Hispanic, Native American, Asian,
and Pacific Islander); UTAH, supra note 7, at 15 (white, African American, American Indian, Asian
American, Hispanic, and Pacific Islander).
35. A major question deserving of future scholarly attention is the extent to which the racial cate-
gories employed in these and other studies provide an adequate basis for analysis.  For the many who
now believe that race is socially constructed, troublesome questions arise whenever we choose to rely
on such data.  See generally, MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES (1994); see also Ian F. López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).  The dilemma in brief is this:
For those who consider racial categories to be socially and not biologically determined, can we legiti-
mately use statistical information gathered upon invalid premises of “race” without promoting the
unwanted effects of those racial categories?  Social science researchers may downplay the variability
and historically contingent nature of racial categories by treating race as a contingent biological fact
rather than a social construct.  See Robert S. Chang, Critiquing “Race” and Its Uses: Critical Race
Theory’s Uncompleted Argument, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE
THEORY 90 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (arguing that critical race scholars must “think crea-
tively about how to translate social construction theory to be meaningful to [its] target audiences”).
This important question is beyond the scope of this article.
36. See OREGON, supra note 6, at 21 (studying arrests in Portland 1998 and three Washington
counties); UTAH, supra note 7, at 20–21 (describing data challenges which made its task “difficult, time
consuming, and at times, ultimately frustrating”).  The Task Force contracted with the University of
Utah’s Social Research Institute to conduct statistical research on its behalf, and its report includes sev-
eral recommendations about data collection efforts that should be undertaken in the future.  See UTAH,
supra note 7, at 91–95.
37. The Oregon Working Group collected data concerning four “key decision points”: arrest,
prosecution, sentencing, and supervision.  OREGON, supra note 6, at 8.  The Working Group collected
its data from several local agencies, including the Gresham Police Department, the Multnomah County
District Attorney’s Office, the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office, the Department of Community Jus-
tice, and the Multnomah County Court.  Id. at 4.  The Washington Commission collected both qualita-
tive and quantitative data on factors relevant to charging and sentencing decisions. WASHINGTON I,
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Across the three research designs, the two most common decision points
examined were charging decision39 and sentencing outcome.40  Collectively, the
three research groups considered a variety of independent variables including
certain social and legal characteristics of the offenders, such as race, age,
gender, the severity of offenses, and prior records.41  The research designs
employed by Oregon and Washington utilized some form of multivariate design
such as log linear or multiple regression analysis,42 and also included qualitative
supra note 7, at 2. The Commission first conducted in-depth interviews with court officials (judges,
prosecutors, and public defenders) involved in the case processing of felony drug offenders.  Id.  The
Commission then gathered information from a random sample of prosecutors’ case files, including the
characteristics of offenders, their actual offending behaviors, and processing decisions from arrest
through sentencing.  Id.  Utah’s Task Force subcommittees gathered data in a multitude of ways,
including both qualitative and quantitative methods. Through a public hearing process the Task Force
was able to obtain feedback from community members concerning their perceptions of race relations.
UTAH, supra note 7, at 45–46.  In addition, the Task Force gathered data about the adult criminal jus-
tice system through the following: (1) subcommittee research and reports—data collection processes
included evaluations, surveys, and focus groups; (2) statistical research by the Social Research Institute
(“SRI”)—empirical data was collected from several different criminal justice agencies throughout Utah
and surveys of several criminal justice administrators were conducted; and (3) perception research by
the SRI—data collection processes included interviews and focus groups with criminal justice personnel
throughout Utah.  Id. at 47–48.  Data on the juvenile criminal justice system was collected via an exami-
nation of a sample of case files, in addition to focus groups and interviews held with youth and juvenile
justice system personnel.  Id. at 49.
38. The states reported mild-to-severe data-collection problems, primarily the difficulty of retriev-
ing data that was sometimes warehoused haphazardly across a system of diffuse justice agencies.  Other
problems included the difficulty of drawing comparisons among data gathered inconsistently by justice
agency personnel, and missing and unkept data.  The Oregon Working Group had difficulties due to
the complexity of comparing data collected at different “key decision points” in the criminal justice
process and the unavailability of reliable, comparable data from which the Group could draw conclu-
sions. OREGON, supra note 6, at 9.  The Commission in Washington reported two limitations in its
study.  First, the data used included only a sample of cases that culminated in felony convictions—
arrests that did not result in a formal charge or conviction and files that involved misdemeanors only
were not included.  Small sample size precluded conducting rigorous analyses concerning the use of
alternative sanctions to prison where relatively strong racial and ethnic differences had previously been
found could not be conducted.  WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 71.  Finally, the Task Force in Utah
reported difficulties due to many factors, including the low frequency in which race data was entered in
database fields, the questionable reliability of race data in existing databases, the low frequency in
which race data was collected, policy changes throughout the state, the size of the Utah population, and
the lack of coordination among Utah’s criminal justice agencies.  UTAH, supra note 7, at 20.
39. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 5, 13–15; OREGON, supra note 6, at 8, 13.
40. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 5, 15–18; OREGON, supra note 6, at 8, 14; UTAH, supra
note 7, at 85–87.
41. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 5; OREGON, supra note 6, at 11–12; UTAH, supra note 7,
at 45–49.
42. The Oregon Working Group analyzed the outcomes at each of the four decision points for
members of each of the subject racial and ethnic groups.  When significant variations appeared between
a minority group’s percentage in the general population and its percentage at one of the key decision
points, the Group gathered additional information to determine if the variations were justifiable or the
result of bias or discrimination. OREGON, supra note 6, at 9. The Washington Commission coded a
random sample of 294 drug-related cases from three different counties using a previously developed
survey instrument. The information coded by the Commission included basic demographic information
about offenders, information about the offense committed, information concerning the circumstances
of arrest, and information regarding the charging and sentencing decisions made in the sampled cases.
WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 47–50.
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assessments.43  The research groups’ most salient findings and a more detailed
description of their methodologies are summarized immediately below.
A. The Oregon Report
The Working Group’s review of statistical and demographic information
within Multnomah County confirmed that minorities were in fact over-repre-
sented within the county’s criminal justice system.  Racial and ethnic disparities
were observed at three of the four decision points examined: arrest, prosecu-
tion, sentencing, and supervision.44  The Working Group benefited greatly from
having among its members Professor William Feyerherm, one of the nation’s
leading experts on the construction of a valid quantitative model to assess the
minority over-representation problem.  With Professor Feyerherm’s guidance,
it is thus not surprising the group opted to analyze the racial fairness of deci-
sions made by justice personnel at multiple junctures in the county’s criminal
justice system.
1. Arrest
Beginning with the stage of arrest, the Working Group’s analysis of statisti-
cal and demographic data showed that racial and ethnic minorities were dispro-
portionately represented in most of the crime categories examined.  The results
differed slightly, however, in the two major cities studied within the county,
Portland and Gresham.
In Portland, African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans were
found to comprise a higher percentage of 1998 aggregated arrests than their
numbers in the general population would have predicted.  African Americans,
who constituted only 8% of Portland residents, made up 25% of the arrests in
that year, a rate greater than three times their percentage in the general popula-
tion.  Nine percent of the total arrests made that same year involved Hispanics,
despite the fact that Hispanics comprised only 4% of Portland residents, a rate
more than two times their percentage in the general population.  By contrast,
whites, who comprised 83% of the Portland population, represented only 62%
of the total arrests, a figure well below what their numbers would have pre-
dicted.  Similarly, Asians, who comprised 6% of Portland residents, represented
only 2% of the total arrests.  45
The aggregate arrest disparities uncovered by the Gresham study were less
severe, perhaps owing in part to the different demographics of the city.  His-
43. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 2, 19–46; UTAH, supra note 7, at 45–49.
44. The group noted that it would have liked to study possible racial effects at additional points,
such as pre-trial detention, pre-trial release decisions, or the negotiation of plea agreements.  Likewise,
it would have preferred to consider whether the race of the victim or the appointment of publicly
funded versus privately retained counsel had an effect on outcome correlated with race.  The data
needed to complete this additional analysis, however, was either unavailable, inadequate, or insuffi-
ciently cost-effective to gather.  See OREGON, supra note 6, at iv.
45. See id. at 12.  The sample of Native Americans was quite small.  Native Americans represented
1% of the Portland residents and 2% of the 1998 Portland arrests.
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panics comprised the greatest percentage of the city’s minority population
(10%) and were arrested only slightly more (11%) than that percentage would
have predicted.  Although African Americans constituted only a very small per-
centage of the Gresham population (only 2%), they fared worse than Hispanics.
Five percent of the total arrests made that year involved members of this
minority group, more than twice their proportion of the general population.  On
the other hand, Native Americans were arrested less often that their numbers
would have predicted (they comprised 2% of the Gresham population, but only
1% of the arrests),46 as were Asians (constituting 2% of total arrests while
making up 4% of the general population), while the arrest rates for whites
matched their percentage in the population identically (82%).
After completing its analysis of aggregate arrest rates, the Working Group
examined the arrest data more closely to detect disparities related to particular
crimes and to reveal race differentials based on arrest localities that were either
not apparent or less dramatic than when the data were aggregated to include
arrests for all crimes and geographical districts.47  This closer look at the data
illuminated additional cause for concern.  An examination of arrests made in
the central business district of Portland, where smaller numbers of minorities
resided than in the larger Portland community, revealed that minorities were in
fact over-represented at arrest in numbers even greater than the aggregate
arrest data suggested.  African Americans constituted only 2% of that district’s
population but represented 25% of the district’s arrests.  Hispanics constituted
only 3% of the district’s residential population, but made up 10% of those
arrested there, and Native Americans constituted scarcely 1% of the district’s
population, but 4% of the district’s arrestees.  Thus, a deeper, disaggregated
look at the arrest data revealed not only over-representation at arrest for cer-
tain minorities, but an especially heightened risk of arrest for minorities present
in the city’s vibrant metropolitan center.
When the Working Group disaggregated the Portland arrest rates to exam-
ine whether the rates varied by nature of the offense, further disparities
appeared.  African Americans were hit particularly hard with respect to arrests
for drug and trespass offenses, though they fared poorly in most other crime
categories as well.48  While comprising only 8% of Portland’s overall population,
African Americans constituted 25% of its overall arrests, 36% of its arrests for
robbery, 37% of its total drug arrests, and 39% of its trespass arrests.  Hispanics
made up 4% of the overall population of Portland, but were 9% of its overall
arrests, 27% of its prostitution-related arrests, 11% of its drug arrests, and
experienced disproportionate arrest rates for alcohol and traffic-related
46. See id.
47. See id. at 19 (explaining that “looking at offenders by crime category could reveal inequitable
treatment not readily apparent at the aggregate level”).
48. See id. at 12, 21 (“[E]ven if the crimes of drug and trespass, where African Americans are
greatly over-represented in arrests, are not included in the total over-representation figures, African
Americans are still greatly over-represented.”).
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offenses (14% of all DUI arrests, 12% of arrests under alcohol laws, and 12% of
all traffic offenses).49
2. Prosecution
The Working Group observed less racial and ethnic variation at key points
in the prosecution process.  In this part of its quantitative analysis, the Working
Group probed possible racial differentials related to rates of prosecution, dis-
missals, and guilty or not guilty verdicts.  All of these stages of the prosecution
process showed fairly consistent treatment of offenders across racial and ethnic
lines.  The data revealed that the District Attorney brought charges in 75% of
cases referred to it and obtained convictions by plea or guilty verdict in 71% of
those cases.50  While Hispanic defendants were slightly over-represented in
these categories (charges filed in 79% of cases involving Hispanics; convictions
obtained in 77%), all other racial groups were very close to, if not below, the
average.51  It was noted, however, that some crimes were prosecuted at higher
rates than other crimes, which the Working Group surmised could indirectly
contribute to the over-representation problem.
3. Sentencing
The Working Group observed a disparity between minority and non-minor-
ity offenders at the point of sentencing.  Review of the available data showed
that African Americans and Hispanics routinely received harsher sentences
than whites for crimes of equivalent severity.  In addition, sentencing courts in
the county offered “lenient options” more often to white and Asian defendants
than to African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American defendants.
To analyze the sentencing decision-point, the Working Group separated the
available sentencing options into three basic categories: probation, jail (short-
term incarceration in a local correctional facility), and prison (longer-term
incarceration in a state facility).  The data revealed that Asian, African-Ameri-
can, and Hispanic defendants faced a higher probability of being sentenced to
prison than white defendants.52  Likewise, African-American, Hispanic, and
Native-American defendants faced a higher than average probability of jail
49. See OREGON, supra note 6, at 21 (concluding that further research focusing on these differen-
tial arrest rates by category might be useful, though it was “unlikely to tell the whole story of over-rep-
resentation”).
50. Id. at 13.
51. Charges were filed in 76% of all cases involving African-American and Native-American
defendants, but convictions obtained in only 70% and 73% of those cases, respectively.  Asian defen-
dants were charged 75% of the time, and white defendants 73% of the time; they were convicted in
71% (Asians) and 70% (whites) of those cases.  See id. at 13.
52. Asian and Hispanic defendants were sentenced to prison 18% of the time.  When only felony
convictions were considered, the percentage grew even larger (Asians received prison sentences in 41%
of the cases and Hispanics in 33% of the cases).  African-American defendants were sentenced to
prison in 16% of the cases, and in 30% of the felony cases.  By contrast, white defendants were sen-
tenced to prison in 14% of all cases, and in 27% of felony cases.  See OREGON, supra note 6, at 14.
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time than other defendants,53 while Asian and white defendants enjoyed a
higher-than-average probability of being sentenced to a term of probation
rather than incarceration.54  The Working Group attempted to determine
whether these sentencing disparities could have been the result of different
offense levels by breaking down the probation, jail, and prison data, and found
that the same patterns observed in the overall sentencing data were present
when felony and misdemeanor convictions were examined separately.55
To further assess the possibility that offense category or prior record might
explain the observed sentencing disparities, the Working Group considered
additional data reflecting the range of sentencing discretion available to the sen-
tencing judges in a select group of felony cases.  Like many other jurisdictions,
Oregon has adopted sentencing guidelines that severely limit the options avail-
able to sentencing judges.  The Working Group analyzed a group of felony
cases in which the presiding judges retained the option to impose either proba-
tion or a term of imprisonment under the applicable guidelines (“optional pro-
bation cases”) and found that when both probation and jail time were available,
sentencing judges were far more likely to sentence white offenders to probation
than Hispanic or African-American offenders.56
The optional probation felony cases fell into one of two categories: those in
which prison was the presumptive sentence, or those in which probation was the
presumptive sentence.  In both categories, white offenders fared far better than
African-American and Hispanic offenders.57  In the group of felony cases in
which prison was the presumptive sentence, sentencing judges imposed prison
terms on only 21% of white defendants, whereas African Americans in the
same presumptive category received prison sentences almost 43% of the time,
and Hispanics almost 60% of the time.58  Put slightly differently, white offenders
whose crimes presumptively called for some term of imprisonment were instead
sentenced to probation twice as often as African Americans, and nearly three
times as often as Hispanics.
In the group of felonies for which probation was presumptively the appro-
priate sentence, judges sentenced whites to probation in 48% of the cases, but
sentenced African Americans to probation in only 36% of the cases.  Hispanics
53. African-American defendants received a jail sentence in 52% of all cases studied, Hispanics in
50%, and Native Americans in 55%, whereas white defendants were sentenced to jail in 47% of the
cases and Asian defendants in only 27%.  In felony cases, the gap was even wider.  Asians and whites
received jail sentences in 23% and 35% of the felony cases, respectively, while the chances of a jail term
for the African Americans (42%), Hispanics (46%), and Native Americans (56%) was much higher.
See id.
54. Asian defendants stood a 55% chance of being sentenced to probation in all cases studied,
whites a 40% chance, Native Americans a 34% chance, and African Americans and Hispanics each a
32% chance.  See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 23.
57. The number of cases fitting this description for Asian and Native Americans was too small to
enable statistically reliable conclusions to be drawn.  See id. at 22.
58. See id. at 22–23.
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fared even worse.  Despite the presumption in their favor, judges sentenced
Hispanics to probation only 11% of the time.59
In short, notwithstanding the goal of sentencing guidelines to decrease arbi-
trariness and increase uniformity of treatment at sentencing, the Oregon
Working Group’s analysis of the sentencing data revealed fairly dramatic and
disturbing variances in sentencing across racial and ethnic lines.  Minorities
were sentenced more harshly and whites more leniently.  Moreover, by utilizing
a multivariate approach, the Working Group was able to conclude that the
over-representation observed in the sentencing data could not “be explained
away by reference to the offense category charged or to the prior record of the
individuals involved because the particular groups analyzed [were] similar with
respect to” both.60
4. Supervision
For African-American offenders, racial disparities continued even beyond
the sentencing stage.  The Working Group’s quantitative analysis revealed that
African-American prisoners in Multnomah County were far more likely than
other minority prisoners to be subject to post-verdict supervision by the
Department of Community Justice,61 and more likely than other prisoners to be
assessed as “high risk to re-offend.”62  While the percentage of African Ameri-
cans subject to supervision was roughly equivalent to their percentage of the
arrest data (22% subject to supervision versus 23% of all arrests), the supervi-
sion percentages for other minorities were strikingly lower than their arrest
statistics.63  African Americans subject to supervision were also far more likely
to be administratively sanctioned while completing the terms of their release.
The Department of Community Justice imposes administrative sanctions when
an offender violates one or more of the conditions of supervision.  These sanc-
tions can include anything from referral to a rehabilitative program to revoca-
tion of parole.64  The Working Group examined the supervision data to identify
any racial differentials between the total number of offenders subject to super-
vision and the number of those administratively sanctioned, finding that Afri-
can-American offenders experienced the greatest “discrepancy between the
percent of caseload and the percent receiving administrative sanction.”65
59. See id. at 23.
60. See id. at 24.
61. The Department oversees the supervision of adult offenders sentenced to probation, released
from custody on parole, or sentenced to prison and some form of post-prison supervision.  See
OREGON, supra note 6, at 17.
62. This disparity raises questions about whether institutional personnel, even if not motivated by
racial animus, were indirectly influenced by racial considerations.
63. Asians comprised 2.3% of all arrests (in Portland, Gresham, and the Sheriff’s Office) but only
1.8% of the cases subject to state supervision.  Native Americans comprised 2.1% of the arrests, but
only 1.2% of the state supervised cases.  Hispanics comprised 9.5% of the arrests and only 4.9% of the
cases subject to state supervision.  The numbers for whites were higher, probably due to their higher
rates of probation (63% of arrests, 70.1% of supervised cases).  See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
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Although they constituted only 22% of those subject to post-conviction state
supervision, African Americans represented 36% of the cases in which adminis-
trative sanctions were imposed.66  In addition to being sanctioned in numbers
disproportionate to their percentage of the supervised cases, further analysis of
the types of sanctions administered revealed that supervised African Americans
received the most odious of available administrative sanctions—revocation of
parole and incarceration—slightly more often than the overall proportion of
offenders received that sanction (79% versus 77%).67  In summary, the Oregon
report described an over-representation problem for certain minorities that
began at the “front door” of the county jailhouse and continued as they pro-
ceeded to sentencing and post-adjudication supervision.  By comparison, white
offenders fared better at nearly every decision point examined.
5. Critique of the Oregon Report
Measured against the traditional standards for empirical reliability, the ana-
lytical approach taken by the Working Group, including multivariate as well as
bivariate analysis at multiple junction points, helped to ensure the integrity of
its conclusions.  The Group’s willingness to delve deeper into the data by “dis-
aggregating” it into sub-districts provided even greater assurance of the reli-
ability of its quantitative results.  Although it is important to have sufficient
data to work with, there are empirical drawbacks to aggregating data across city
or county lines, or indiscriminately using state-wide data.  When data from two
or more jurisdictions with different experiences are aggregated, the combina-
tion of the data can have the effect of diluting otherwise observable racialized
patterns of decision-making and “obscure identification of jurisdictions in which
minorities are at a considerable disadvantage.”68
A possible concern about the Oregon Working Group’s approach is that
there was no documented effort to gather qualitative information to better
inform its quantitative results.  As shown in Part II, doing so might have led to a
better understanding of the findings in the report about administrative sanc-
66. By contrast, each of the other racial and ethnic groups examined made up a smaller percentage
of the “sanctioned” group than their percentage of the “supervised” group.  White offenders made up
70% of the supervised cases, but only 59% of the sanctioned cases.  Asians constituted 1.8% of the
supervised cases and 0.7% of the sanctioned cases.  Hispanics represented 4.9% of the supervised cases
and 2.6% of those administratively sanctioned.  Native Americans constituted 1.2% of those under
supervision, and 1.6% of those sanctioned.  Id.
67. See id. at 102.
68. See Pope & Feyerherm, supra note 23, at 335.  Professors Pope and Feyerherm detected such a
skewing effect in a study they conducted of statewide juvenile justice data from Florida and California.
The scholars reported that although clear racial effects were observable in several counties of those
states, when data from those counties was examined on a statewide level “the strength of those patterns
was considerably diminished.”  Id.  The opposite phenomenon is also possible, of course.  A researcher
may miss racial effects that become observable only when data from the entire state is considered in the
aggregate.  For example, a study of data from individual counties may display no substantial difference
in the way that whites, African Americans, and Latinos are treated until those data are considered from
a statewide perspective.  See id.  In short, unless researchers are careful to consider local anomalies,
they may miss the trees for the forest.  At the same time, failure to consider the larger statewide picture
may lead them to miss the forest for the trees.
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tions imposed on African-American offenders.  On the whole, however, meas-
ured against conventional standards for accuracy and reliability, the analytical
effort of the Oregon Working Group stands up well to critique.
B. The Washington Report
Unlike Oregon and Utah, the Washington Commission chose as its primary
focus the role, if any, that race and ethnicity played, in the charging decisions of
prosecutors respecting felony drug offenders.69  Secondarily, the Commission
examined the effect charging decisions and other factors had on available sen-
tencing options, in the hope that such an examination might provide further
insight into the racial and ethnic disparities that had been detected at the sen-
tencing level by a statewide study completed the year prior in 1999.70  The
earlier study had employed a multinomial logistic regression model to analyze a
database of 25,030 felony drug convictions entered over a three-and-a-half-year
period (July 1, 1995 to December 31, 1998).  After controlling for a variety of
legal factors, the earlier study found “relatively small” racial and ethnic effects
on offender sentence length,71 but “considerable” racial and ethnic effects on
the type of sentence employed,72 and “significant variation” across racial and
ethnic groups in the employment of sanctions alternative to imprisonment.73
The Commission purported to explore these sentencing disparities “in
greater depth” in its later study by considering the impact prosecutors’ charging
decisions might have had on the sentencing options available to judges.74  It also
gathered and analyzed data not considered in the earlier study, such as quantity
of drugs involved in the offenses and “more accurate indicators of ethnicity” to
help explain the sentencing disparities observed.  In addition, the Commission
gathered qualitative information to help provide a more complete understand-
ing of observed differentials.75  Given its goal of improving on the earlier sen-
tencing study by, among other things, adding a second stage of the criminal jus-
69. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 5.
70. See id.; see also WASHINGTON STATE MINORITY AND JUSTICE COMMISSION, RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING OUTCOMES FOR DRUG OFFENDERS IN WASHINGTON STATE
(1999) [hereinafter WASHINGTON II].
71. See WASHINGTON II, supra note 70, at 17–18.  The study found that while “the overall impact
of race and ethnicity on sentence length appear[ed] to be small, net of legal factors,” some differences
did appear.  Id at 17.  “Most notably, the effects of conviction of drug delivery, and offense involving
hard drugs, each [had] a slightly greater impact on sentence length for minority offenders than for white
offenders.”  Id. at 17–18.
72. See id. at 19.  The study found, controlling for differences in offending, “the likelihood of incar-
ceration is considerably greater for racial/ethnic minorities than it is for white offenders.”  Id.
73. See id. at 23.
74. The predominant theme of the study was that prosecutors’ charging decisions so greatly affect
the options available to sentencing judges that even if racial or ethnic disparities were seen at sentenc-
ing, the source of those disparities would likely lie with prosecutors, not sentencing judges.  The Com-
mission provided several examples of the interrelated nature of charging decisions and sentencing out-
comes.  If, for example, the prosecutor chose to charge that a drug offense occurred within a certain
distance from a school, the sentencing guidelines would call for a sentencing enhancement of the
offense score, which would open up the possibility of a harsher sentencing range.  See id. at 12.
75. See id. at 6.
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tice process (the charging stage), it is perplexing that the Commission chose to
analyze only a small fraction of the cases analyzed in the earlier study.  As
noted previously, the 1999 sentencing study gathered and analyzed data
reflecting more than 25,000 felony drug convictions entered across the state of
Washington over a three-year period.  By contrast, the Commission based its
more recent analysis of charging and sentencing decisions on a randomly
selected pool of 301 felony drug convictions entered in three counties of the
state in a single year.  Due to the small sample size, only five of the cases in the
sample involved Native-American offenders and only three involved Asian-
American offenders.  Concerns about the lack of statistical significance of those
cases led the Commission to eliminate those minority groups from the database.
This reduced the data to 294 cases, involving white, African-American, and
Hispanic offenders only.76
In addition to a significantly reduced database, the Commission chose to
constrict its analysis to two of the multiple processing junctions in the Washing-
ton criminal justice system (the prosecutorial and sentencing junctions), with a
primary focus on only one of those stages—acts of prosecutorial discretion.77  In
defense of this relatively cabined focus, the Commission reasoned that the
adoption of sentencing guidelines had dramatically shifted the control over sen-
tencing outcomes from judges to prosecutors.  In the Commission’s view, this
justified a more tailored analysis of how, if at all, offenders’ race or ethnicity
related to prosecutors’ charging decisions78 rather than judge’s sentencing deci-
sions, since the prosecutors’ charging decisions inevitably would impact and
limit the sentencing options open to judges.79  The Commission also noted that
the earlier state sentencing study had focused exclusively on the role race and
ethnicity had played in sentencing decisions, and thus special attention to the
charging stage was warranted.80
In defense of its choice to study data related to the possible disparate effect
of charging decisions regarding drug offenders as opposed to all offenders, the
Commission noted simply the dramatic and disproportionate increase in the
number of minorities imprisoned after the nation declared its “war on drugs.”81
The Commission’s report is silent as to whether the group considered the possi-
76. The Commission limited its study to King, Pierce, and Yakima counties, the counties responsi-
ble for roughly half of the state’s felony drug prosecutions and three-quarters of the African-American
and Hispanic sentenced drug offenders.  See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 19.
77. The Commission criticized the earlier study for examining only one stage of the justice process,
sentencing, even though it was content to add only one additional stage to its inquiry.  See id. at 4.
78. Charging includes decisions to file, amend, or dismiss charges, and decisions to extend or with-
hold a plea bargain.
79. See generally MICHAEL H. TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996).
80. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 3.  The earlier study had explored racial and ethnic dis-
parities in sentencing outcomes for drug offenders and had concluded that while minority drug offend-
ers received longer sentences on average than non-minority offenders, the differences were principally,
though not entirely, attributable to legal versus extra-legal factors.
81. Id. at 3–4.
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bility that such a single-offense emphasis might cloak disparities made visible
only by cross-offense comparisons.
1. The Washington Commission’s Quantitative Analysis
a. Prosecutors’ charging decisions.  Beginning with an examination of
prosecutor’s charging decisions, the Commission sorted its data into three drug
offense types charged: delivery offenses, anticipatory delivery offenses, and
possession offenses.  The Commission analyzed the data by county to determine
county level differences in “offender and offense types, police activity, and
charging practices.”82  The Commission found that while “whites were far more
likely to be arrested for possession (63%),” and “African American and His-
panic offenders were more likely to be arrested for delivery type offenses (72%
and 58% respectively),”83 by the time of charging, the minorities benefited from
considerable movement toward the lesser possession offense.  While charging
disparities were not completely eliminated after the arrest stage,84 the Commis-
sion believed it significant that the percentage of African-Americans charged
with drug possession rather than drug delivery grew from the time of their
arrest (28% to 45%), and the percentage of Hispanics charged with possession
rather than delivery grew from the time of their arrest (42% to 53%).  By the
time of conviction, the Commission noted even greater movement.  While
nearly 80% of all those arrested on delivery charges were initially charged with
a delivery offense, by the time of conviction, only about one-third of that group
was actually convicted on a delivery charge. This statistic reflected significant
plea bargaining behavior by prosecutors that appeared unrelated to racial and
ethnic factors.85  “[T]he data provide no evidence that race and ethnicity are
important factors affecting charging decisions for drug offenders,”86 the Com-
mission concluded.  While prosecutors routinely changed offenders’ charges
between initial filing and conviction, this plea bargaining behavior did not
consistently appear to “advantage or disadvantage any particular group of
offenders.”87  Rather, the longer sentences received by minorities appeared to
result from “legal” factors, such as the type of controlled substance involved in
the offense conduct.
b. Prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations.  The Commission also
explored prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations by race and ethnicity of
offenders.  After reviewing the sentence recommendations in the 294 cases, the
Commission acknowledged that “on average prosecutors recommend signifi-
cantly longer sentences for blacks (on average twelve months longer) than for
82. Id. at 52.
83. Id. at 55.
84. Whites were still more likely than African Americans and Hispanics to be charged with a pos-
session offense.
85. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 63.  The group of offenders most likely to be convicted of
delivery versus possession were those who declined to plead and were convicted after trial.  Id.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id.
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whites.”88  After controlling for type of crime, however, the Commission con-
cluded that the differentials were due to legal, not extra-legal factors.  As would
be expected, the Commission wrote “prosecutors recommend longer sentences
for those offenders convicted of delivery and anticipatory offenses as opposed
to those convicted of simple possession.”89  Thus, the disparity in prosecutors’
sentencing recommendations did not strike the Commission as attributable to
racial or ethnic bias.
c. Judges’ sentencing decision.  With respect to sentencing decisions, the
Commission acknowledged that judges sentenced African-American offenders
to sentences that were an average of six months longer than white offenders.
Nevertheless, following the same analytic approach as that applied to prosecu-
tors’ charging and sentencing recommendations, the Commission concluded
“these differences disappear once legally relevant factors” are considered.90
According to the Commission, the most significant factor in length of sentence
was the applicable guideline range91 rather than offender race or ethnicity.
Judges simply applied the sentence the guidelines mandated based on the
offender’s role in a particular crime and his criminal history.
2. The Commission’s Qualitative Results
In addition to the quantitative analysis and findings described above, the
Washington Commission also gathered qualitative information by interviewing
some of the key players in the state’s criminal justice system.92  While most of
the respondents to the interviews reported personal awareness of the over-rep-
resentation of minorities within the system, as a whole they did not perceive
those gaps to be attributable to racial or ethnic bias by prosecutors or judges.
Rather, most opined that the disparities were due to differences in offending
behavior, such as the type of drug involved93 or the nature of the offender’s con-
nection to it, which could lead to steeper sentences.94  Very few interviewed by
88. See id. at 64.
89. Id. at 65.
90. Id. at 66.
91. The Commission concluded:
In summary, it appears that on average prosecutors recommend, and judges sentence, Afri-
can-American offenders to longer periods of incarceration than they do whites, but that this
can be entirely explained by the types of drug offenses that offenders are convicted of, their
prior criminal history, and the guidelines recommended by the State of Washington.  Once
legal factors are controlled, the only extra-legal factors affecting a prosecutor’s recommended
sentence length is whether the case was convicted at trial.  Because sentencing recommenda-
tions, and the guidelines, determine the sentence ordered, trial conviction has little or no
independent effect on the actual sentence length imposed.
Id. at 67.
92. The Commission interviewed judges, public defenders, and prosecutors.  See WASHINGTON I,
supra note 7, at 38.
93. The quantitative data supported this anecdotal information.  Of all offenders studied, 84% of
African-American offenders, 71% of Hispanics, and 30% of whites were arrested for involvement with
cocaine.  Id. at 75.
94. See id. at 39.  According to the interviewees, white offenders were arrested more often in con-
nection with methamphetamine and marijuana, while African Americans and Hispanics were arrested
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the Commission believed that offender’s race and ethnicity affected processing
outcomes more directly.95
A greater concern, however, was expressed about the fairness of arrest deci-
sions.  A majority of those interviewed believed that the racial and ethnic dis-
parities among offenders could be attributable to differential arrest rates.
While the respondents disagreed about whether these differences were attribut-
able to offender or police behavior,96 most pointed to this early stage as the
original source of the differentials.  Despite the consensus of views, the Com-
mission declined to broaden its analysis to examine data concerning the arrest
decisions of the police.97  Instead, based on the quantitative98 and qualitative99
data gathered, the Commission concluded that it had been right to focus on the
decisions of prosecutors as the critical stage for review in the state’s criminal
justice process.100  In its view, the data provided insufficient proof that the dis-
proportionate number of minorities processed through the Washington criminal
justice system was the result of racial or ethnic bias.
3. Critique of the Washington Report
The Washington Commission’s decision to tailor its focus narrowly on only
two of the multiple stages of the case processing system raises serious concerns
about the validity of its conclusions.101  As explored in Part II, scholars have
made strong arguments about the need to examine multiple junctures in a
criminal justice system to reach reliable conclusions about the presence or lack
of racial bias with the system.102  This includes the point of arrest, the point at
which the prosecutor decides or declines to move forward with the case, the
point of detention or pre-trial release, the point of formal charge (such as by
more often in connection with cocaine and heroin offenses; whites were arrested more often on suspi-
cion of possession or manufacturing, while minorities were arrested more often on suspicion of distribu-
tion.  See id. at 39–40.
95. See id. at 43–44.
96. See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 37, 40–42.  One judge opined that the differential arrest
rates were due to the greater visibility of drug crimes committed on the street, which disproportionately
involved minorities, rather than behind closed doors.  Although such a policing practice would dispro-
portionately affect minorities, it might also be justifiable, the judge reasoned, given the overtly public
aspect of the criminal behavior.  See id. at 41.  Such police behavior “is not racist,” the judge concluded,
even though it “has important effects on different racial groups.”  See id.  A few respondents believed
that racial profiling played a role in the arrest differentials.  See id. at 42.
97. The Commission wrote without further justification: “Because the focus of this study is on
charging and sentencing decisions, we did not purposively [sic] collect information on arrest patterns.”
See id. at 42.
98. The Commission supplemented previously gathered data from the state Sentencing Guideline
Commission with data culled from prosecutors’ case files regarding the quantity of drugs involved in
the offense, the reasons for the arrest, and improved information about ethnicity of the offender.  See
id. at 47–50.
99. This included “in-depth interviews with court officials” including judges, prosecutors, and
defense counsel.  See id. at 5.
100. See id. at 2.
101. The Commission tailored its analysis in two ways, by focusing primarily on the charging deci-
sions of prosecutors, and on felony drug offenses to the exclusion of all other offenses.  See id. at 5.
102.See supra text accompanying notes 19–22.
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indictment) or non-prosecution agreement, the point at which a plea-bargain is
or is not struck, the point of conviction or acquittal by a factfinder, and the
point of sentencing to a term of incarceration or alternative form of punish-
ment.103
There are several advantages to following this laborious but informative
data-collection process.  Most important, analysts can better position them-
selves to determine whether variations in the decisions of institutional players
are significantly correlated with race if they scrutinize the actions of multiple
persons with decision-making authority vis-à-vis suspected individual offenders,
such as police, prosecutors, judges, and probation personnel.  If a correlation is
detected, the multifaceted information provided by data associated with multi-
ple decision points makes it possible to consider whether the “professional phi-
losophies, organizational subcultures, and discretionary authority” of these
decision-makers explain the observed disparities.  Those disparities, in turn, can
help to illuminate whether the racially discriminatory effects are intentional or
the indirect result of institutional rules, policies, and structures.104
Failure to examine multiple decision points can also seriously limit the
researcher’s ability to uncover otherwise hidden racial effects.  As empiricists
Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier put it, “if a researcher examines only a
single decision point, such as judicial disposition, the researcher’s analyses may
underestimate or altogether miss the effect of race.”105  Likewise, “[i]f disparities
occur at early decision points that are not examined, analyses of late-stage out-
comes are likely to produce findings of no discrimination.”106
The serious implications of the Washington Commission’s decision not to
expand its analysis to additional decision-makers comes into sharper focus
when one contrasts its approach with that of the Oregon Working Group.  As
discussed above, the Oregon Working Group analyzed decisions respecting
minority offenders at four junctures of its criminal justice process.  Like Wash-
ington, one of those junctures was the charging decisions of prosecutors, and
like Washington, the Working Group found little evidence of racial differentials
related to the rates of minority prosecution, dismissals, or plea offers.107  Unlike
Washington, however, by extending its study beyond this single stage to four
points of the justice process, the Oregon Working Group found evidence of
racial and ethnic gaps which otherwise would have gone undetected.  Thus, con-
sistent with the recommendations of the literature discussed in Part II, the far
more inclusive Oregon methodology produced results which underscore the
103. See CARL POPE & WILLIAM FEYERHERM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, MINORITIES & THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: RESEARCH SUMMARY (1993).
104. See Bishop & Frazier, Race Effects, supra note 25, at 393 (examining data collected by Florida
authorities related to the over-representation of minority youth in the state’s juvenile justice system).
105. See id. at 394.
106. Id.; see also Bishop & Frazier, Influence, supra note 19, at 242; Bortner & Reed, supra note 18,
at 414.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 50–51, 81–91.
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importance of examining multiple decision stages in the justice process.  Had
Oregon been content to look at charging decisions only, it too would have
reached the conclusion that “no evidence” indicated that race or ethnicity
affected institutional decision-makers.  By looking further, Oregon observed
racial and ethnic gaps across the system which worsened as minority offenders
moved through the process.  By failing to broaden its analysis beyond charging
and sentencing, the Commission may have seriously compromised the reliability
of its conclusions.108
Even if one puts aside the implications of the structural decision made by
the Washington Commission to limit its analysis to only two stages of the justice
process, an additional complaint may be leveled against its choice of those par-
ticular stages of the process.  A growing body of literature has made the argu-
ment that over-representation problems are attributable to the selection biases
of the institutional actors most responsible for the flow of bodies into those sys-
tems—namely, the police.  Because the decisions made by these gatekeepers to
the justice process mean the difference between investigation and non-investi-
gation, arrest and non-arrest, actions taken by the police are worthy of espe-
cially careful scrutiny for signs of conscious or unconscious bias.  Many studies
suggest that over-representation problems that exist from the point of arrest
escalate as arrestees proceed past additional decision points within criminal jus-
tice systems.109  That is, not only do minorities enter these systems in numbers
disproportionate to their numbers in the general population, but they suffer
increasing racial effects as they penetrate further into these systems.
The important work of David Harris,110 John Lamberth,111 and others on the
topic of racial profiling provides good reason to examine the racial neutrality of
police investigative behavior at the level of the street.112  Based on this body of
work, and highly publicized racial profiling allegations across the country,
108. A possible defense that might be offered by the Washington Commission is that the same body
had completed a study a year earlier which had analyzed separately the impact of race and ethnicity on
sentencing outcomes in drug cases.  See generally WASHINGTON II, supra note 70.  That earlier study,
however, is susceptible to the same criticism: It analyzed only a single stage rather than multiple junc-
tures of the justice process.  In addition, the earlier study failed to take into account crime and offender
characteristics that might have provided an explanation for why judges employed certain sentencing
ranges or options.  Finally, the analysis failed to incorporate qualitative information that provide a
fuller understanding of the patterns that appear from the data.
109. For a particularly compelling account of the selection bias problem in the context of the over-
representation of minority youths in juvenile justice systems, see Pope & Feyerherm, supra note 23.
110. See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
(2002).
111. John Lamberth, Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of Police Stops and Arrests of
Black Drivers/Travellers on the New Jersey Turnpike Between Interchanges 1 and 3 from the Years
1988 Through 1991 (submitted to the Court in State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 354 (N.J. Super. 1996)).
112. These scholars have argued persuasively that the disproportionate representation of minorities
in the criminal justice system may be no more mysterious than the disproportionate number of interac-
tions between police officers and persons of color.  Such interactions provide increased opportunities
for the development of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, and in turn provide increased oppor-
tunities for more intrusive investigative actions, including frisks and full scale searches, which are for-
midable precursors to the gathering of criminal evidence.
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leading social scientists studying the minority offender over-representation
problem have begun to emphasize that empirical assessments of disproportion-
ate minority offender status should proceed from the point of arrest.113  Notwith-
standing these calls for broader empirical inquiry, the vast majority of minority
offender studies have scrutinized the conduct of justice officials who have come
into contact with offenders after, and sometimes well after, the initial police-
citizen contacts have occurred.114
More fundamentally, the size of the database on which the Washington
Commission relied undermines the Commission’s claim of improving upon the
earlier sentencing study.  The relatively small sample size used by the Commis-
sion (294 cases versus over 25,000 analyzed in the earlier study) unquestionably
affected its ability to analyze racial and ethnic effects on sentencing decisions,
even across the three counties on which it chose to focus.  This decision directly
affected the Commission’s ability to analyze the treatment of Native-American
and Asian-American offenders.  No such analysis could be conducted due to its
lack of statistical significance.  Moreover, because the Commission chose to use
a random sample of the cases considered in the earlier sentencing report, and
because it limited its focus to felonies, only a few of the 294 cases studied by the
Commission involved offenders who were eligible for alternative sanctions.115
Thus, the Commission was unable to do anything more than note the earlier
study’s finding of “strong race and ethnic differences” in the use of alternative
sanctions.116
Given the insurmountable hurdles presented by its choice of data, it is sur-
prising that the Commission could feel sufficiently confident to proclaim that
the racial and ethnic disparities observed by it and the earlier study were due to
legal and not extra-legal factors.  Perhaps more importantly, the Commission’s
conclusions reveal its implicit assumptions about the racial neutrality of those
legal variables.  It seems clear that the Commission did not conceive of the pos-
113. See, e.g., Bortner & Reed, supra note 18, at 421 (“Future research will be more fruitful if we are
able to trace the involvement of [an offender] cohort throughout the entire process, [including] explor-
ing police decisions to arrest.”).
114. To be fair, until recently attempts to study the impact of race and ethnicity on decisions to stop
and arrest were stymied by the seemingly insurmountable problem of a lack of data.  See David A.
Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law: Why ‘Driving While Black’ Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV.
265 (1999).  The police rarely recorded identifying information about the race or ethnicity of motorists,
pedestrians, travelers, or others with whom they interacted.  No laws required them to do so, and given
that the voluntary collection of such data might actually be used against them, law enforcement officers
perceived no upside to such data collection efforts and rarely undertook them.  Even where such
information was gathered, it was rarely publicly disseminated or made available for empirical study.
See id.
115. Washington judges may sometimes choose among a number of alternatives to the imposition of
a prison or jail term.  Briefly, these include the option of ordering a reduced jail term and drug treat-
ment for certain first-time offenders (known as the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (“DOSA”)),
the possibility of granting a reduced jail term and period of community service for other eligible first-
time offenders (known as First-Time Offender Waiver (“FTOW”)), and ordering an eligible offender’s
participation in a Work Ethic Camp (“WEC”) with subsequent release into the community upon suc-
cessful completion of the 120- to 180-day program.  See WASHINGTON I, supra note 7, at 17-18.
116. See id. at 71.
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sibility that disparities attributable to prior criminal history, type of drug
involved in the offense, or applicable guideline range, though technically classi-
fiable as “legal” variables, could nevertheless import significant racial and
ethnic effects into the analysis.117
C. The Utah Report
Members of the Utah Task Force unanimously accepted as a “premise fact”
that minorities were over-represented at every stage within its criminal justice
system.118  Similar agreement existed among the group that the over-representa-
tion problem appeared to worsen as minority offenders moved deeper into the
system.119  As it began its work, however, the Task Force was divided about the
cause of those numerical disparities.  From the start, members of the group
strongly disagreed about whether the presence of such differentials meant that
“racial or ethnic bias existed within system.”120  While conscious or unconscious
bias might be the culprit, the Task Force noted, a number of the members of the
group thought it equally plausible that heightened minority criminality was the
source of the disparities (perhaps because forces of socio-economic disadvan-
tage drove minorities to commit more crimes).121
As was true in Oregon and Washington, the Utah Task Force hoped to
name the true cause of the minority over-representation problem after exam-
ining the objective data and comparing the experiences of similarly situated
groups as they moved past certain decision points.  In the end, however,
severely limited data and the immensity of the analytic task prevented it from
being able to identify the actual cause of the racial and ethnic disparities.122
Thus, it abandoned its effort to confirm or deny the reality of racial or ethnic
bias within the system, and refocused its attention on whether minorities in
Utah perceived such bias to exist.123
As to its qualitative assessments, the Utah Task Force faced fewer obstacles.
In addition to interviews with Utah attorneys and judges, the group conducted a
series of public hearings to gather information about perceptions of the treat-
ment of minorities in the system.  The interviewees and hearing witnesses dis-
agreed as to whether minorities were treated unfairly at different stages of the
justice process on the basis of race or ethnicity.  The opinions expressed in the
117. See supra text accompanying notes 23–28.
118. See UTAH, supra note 7, at 17.  The racial composition of the state of Utah in 1997 was
approximately 89% white, 0.86% African American, 6.44% Hispanic, 2.48% Asian Pacific Islander and
1.41% American Indian.  Id. at 41.  Hispanics were over-represented at every stage of the criminal jus-
tice process.  Id.
119. See id. at 19 (observing “greater disproportionality at incarceration than at arrest”).
120. See id. at 17.
121. See id. at 19.
122. See UTAH, supra note 7, at 20.  To remedy this problem in the future, the group asked the
Social Research Institute of the University of Utah to design a model for future analysis of minority
disproportionality, including a prescription of the data collection efforts that would be necessary to
enable quantitative analysis.
123. See id. at 19.
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interviews and hearings did coalesce around one issue of possible unfair treat-
ment, however—racial profiling practices by the police.  Witnesses at the public
hearings described profiling as a part of minorities’ “everyday experience,” a
practice so ubiquitous that most persons of color simply accepted it as “a part of
life that must be endured.”124  Similarly, during interviews, attorneys and judges
agreed that racial profiling was a problem in the state.
Faced with this anecdotal evidence, the Task Force sought to test the reality
of racial profiling practices within the state.  Despite the strong consensus
among the anecdotes and opinions gathered by the Task Force about racial pro-
filing practices, the Task Force members themselves strongly disagreed about
the reality of racial profiling in Utah.125  But, again, when the group attempted to
determine who was right, it found itself thwarted by a lack of available quantita-
tive data.126  In the absence of that data, the Task Force found it necessary to
stress that the opinions expressed in the hearings and interviews on the matter
“were not meant to establish fact.”127  They simply reflected “people’s perspec-
tives and interpretations of their experience of racial and ethnic bias,” and
could not “establish in any objective way whether such bias does or does not
occur.”128  “While many groups and individuals” had attempted to prove the
reality of racial profiling within the state, the Task Force went on, none had
provided “conclusive” proof that the police actually engaged in the practice.129
On this question, too, it recommended further study and requested its research
consultants to assess existing databases and develop a list of additional data
fields that would be needed for future analysis.130
It is, of course, not possible to critique an empirical effort never conducted.  It
also appears unseemly to be overly critical of a state reviewing body presented
with such severe data retrieval problems that it was prevented from carrying out
its primary mission.  On the other hand, one is entitled to wonder whether, by
employing one of the wide variety of data-gathering methods developed and
utilized by other criminal justice researchers elsewhere (some admittedly quite
labor and time intensive), the Task Force could have gathered sufficient demo-
graphic and offender data to enable some review of the state’s confessed over-
representation problem.  Racial and ethnic offender information is now avail-
able in most jurisdictions, provided researchers are willing to put in the hours
necessary to gather and properly code that information for quantitative assess-
ment.131  Researchers outside Utah have also managed to secure data regarding
124. Id.
125. Id. at 28.
126. Id. at 27; see also HARRIS, supra note 110.
127. UTAH, supra note 7, at 27.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 84.
131. Ethnic heritage has posed special problems for researchers.  It is not unusual for court papers
to describe a Hispanic defendant as white, for example.  This may necessitate a more thorough review
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an offender’s past criminal record, type of drug involved, weight of drug
involved, use of violence, or gravity of the offense more generally.  Thus, it is
difficult to understand how Utah’s data storage difficulties could so completely
disable it from conducting any quantitative analysis whatsoever.
More fundamentally, it is valuable to reflect on how the Task Force dealt
with the statistical information that was available to it, and the qualitative
information it was able to gather.  As argued more fully below, from the start of
its work, the members of the Task Force unanimously accepted as a premise
fact that minorities were disproportionately over-represented within the Utah
criminal justice system, and that the gravity of the observed disparities
increased as minorities moved further into that system.  Despite this consensus,
and despite apparent agreement among the judges and lawyers interviewed by
the Task Force about the reality of racial profiling practices within the state, the
Task Force went to great lengths to emphasize that it had no conclusive evi-
dence to support the racial profiling allegations or any other allegations of
racial bias within the system.  I argue below that the Utah review group, like
those in Oregon and Washington, employed a presumption of fairness that
benefitted the system and concomitantly burdened critics of the over-represen-
tation phenomenon.
IV
CONCLUSION
Although it would have been possible for the states to assess the fairness
and social impact of their respective criminal justice systems’ treatment of
minority offenders from any of a number of different angles, central to the
evaluative success of any such assessment is its willingness to recognize and
question its own theoretical assumptions. A review of the studies completed in
Washington, Oregon, and Utah reveals a number of central assumptions, strik-
ing both for the reason that each of the states adhered to them and because the
assumptions themselves are subject to criticism that none of the states consid-
ered.
Each of the central assumptions addressed here involved an effort to iden-
tify the cause of the disproportionality of minority offenders in the systems.
The states tended to assume that minority inmate disproportionality was caused
by one of two things: disproportionately wrongful conduct by minorities, or dis-
criminatory conduct by the official state actors who came into contact with
them.132  The goal was to discover which of these two explanations was true, or,
of case files and police reports to discover evidence of Hispanic origin.  See, e.g., WASHINGTON I, supra
note 7, at 48.
132. The Oregon Working Group noted that it had briefly considered one other possible contribut-
ing cause—”the general social and economic conditions that may contribute to racial and ethnic
inequality in this country.”  The group concluded, however, that such conditions were “largely out of
the control” of its state justice agencies, and thus focused its attention on those areas within the crimi-
nal justice system that were under those agencies’ control.  See OREGON, supra note 6, at i.
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if both were, to identify the degree to which discriminatory state conduct played
a role in the over-representation problem.
It is important to note that the first explanation—disproportionate minority
criminality—though contemplated by all three states, actually consumed very
little of the researchers’ time.  In fact, this explanation appeared to concern the
three state groups only to the extent that it struck them as necessary to be
raised as a possible alternative source of the over-representation problem.  Put
slightly differently, each of the reports assumed that if minority group criminal-
ity was the culprit, the states would be off the hook, the implication being that
responsibility for the disproportionate numbers in such a case would not lie
with the states, but would belong to those who chose to violate societal norms
and become rule breakers.133  Conversely, if state discriminatory conduct pro-
vided the explanation for the exploding numbers of persons of color within the
state justice systems, remedial action would be necessary.  The errant state
actors would have to be identified and dealt with.  It might even be necessary to
dismiss charges, retry cases, or open the prison doors.  Presumably, the cost of
such a finding would be large and embarrassing.
A second, related, assumption shared by the states was an apparent belief
in, or at least strong hope for, the availability of a mono-causal agent for the
states’ observed over-representation problems.  While each of the state reports
contemplated both minority criminality and discriminatory conduct as possible
explanations for their minority over-representation problems, each also tended
to discuss these possible causalities in the alternative.  Either African Ameri-
cans and Latinos were committing more crime or institutional actors were
dealing with them unfairly, but not both.  This implicitly suggests two things:
first, that disproportionate minority criminality is rightly considered an issue of
individual responsibility and can never be attributable to systemic, discrimina-
tory features of, say, legislative policy (as, for example, by creating a statutory
system that penalizes the distribution of crack cocaine more heavily than the
distribution of powder cocaine); and second, that the genesis of the problem can
be situated in only one place—blameworthy individual behavior or blamewor-
thy institutional actor behavior.
133. Some adherents of this view believe that heightened minority criminality is the inevitable and
unfortunate result of social and economic disadvantage, a status disproportionately borne by persons of
color.  See, e.g., OREGON, supra note 6, at I; UTAH, supra note 7, at 9.  But even those among groups
like the Oregon Working Group, the Washington Commission, and the Utah Task Force who would
name socio-economic disadvantage as the explanation for the over-representation problem uninten-
tionally may erect an obstacle to solution of the problem.  Put slightly differently, the conclusion that
minorities are more likely to become entangled in the criminal justice system because they have fewer
realistic chances for life success implicitly takes the onus off of that system to provide relief for the
observed disparities and places it elsewhere.  Such a view, though “not made with glee or enthusiasm,”
allows the justice system to look at the problem as larger than itself.  As put by two leading researchers
of over-representation: “In effect, the discovery of the underclass allows justice officials to wring their
hands in agony and then throw them up in despair, knowing that no reasonable person would expect
the system to address such a mammoth social problem.  As a result the problem can be effectively
ignored.”  Pope & Feyerherm, supra note 23, at 327–28.
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It is not difficult to see the allure of such a dichotomous approach in a study
of the cause of an over-representation problem, for, as a practical matter, by
posing the possible explanations as a dichotomy—the cause is either this or
that—state researchers give themselves permission to focus their analyses on
only one-half of the equation.  That is, once state research groups conclude that
there is insufficient evidence of official wrongdoing, their present tendency is
simply to leave it to conjecture that the real cause of the over-representation
problem is minority criminality.  Virtually no time is devoted to considering a
third possibility: namely, the existence of social or economic conditions disad-
vantageous to persons of color which may contribute to disproportionate crimi-
nal acts, because those conditions, the reports suggest, lay beyond researchers’
missions.134
Accordingly, the states set about to find the “bad” state actors.  If they
found none, or at least insufficient evidence of any, the implicit answer deliv-
ered to critics of the states’ minority over-representation problems was essen-
tially, “Look in somebody else’s backyard.”  None of the reports acknowledged
that the simple act of raising a dichotomy—minority criminality versus bad state
actor—and attempting to resolve only part of it (no evidence of bad state actor)
would leave hanging in the air the only remaining, unresolved possibility (Afri-
can Americans and Latinos commit more crimes).  Left unstudied, that alterna-
tive explanation would loom like a truth, even without the benefit of scrutiny or
of process.
Another related assumption buried beneath the states’ dichotomous
approach was an unspoken consensus that, assuming minority criminality
turned out to be the cause, the states would owe no responsibility for the natu-
ral, concomitant result of that outsized criminality—the greater presence of
minorities within their respective criminal justice systems.  This agreement
seemed to flow naturally from two simple and implicit premises: Societies set
norms to which they may rightly expect all of their members to adhere and
divergence from those norms is the sole responsibility of the individuals who
choose to engage in that divergent behavior.  When one employs this prism to
understand criminality, societal norms are presumed objective, neutral, and
good, and divergence from those norms is considered subjectively determined,
free-willed, and bad.  Crime is simply the clash between good rules and bad
actors.  Accordingly, if the states determined, after conducting their analyses,
that more minorities were in the criminal justice system because there were
more minority criminals, not only was the state in the clear, but the state was
the victim.  To the extent that DuBois’s “problem of the color line” still existed
at the end of the twentieth century, it would have morphed from a problem of
early-century racism into a problem of late-century-African-American crimi-
134. See supra note 132 (noting that in the event the cause of the over-representation problem was
general social or economic conditions disadvantageous to minorities, those conditions were outside the
control of the states’ justice agencies).
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nality.  And because this new problem was borne by the law-abiding, the state
could justifiably clamp down on the criminals and adopt heavy penalties aimed
at deterring future wrongdoing.
A final assumption evident in each of the reports was the notion that to the
extent the over-representation problem was attributable to state wrongdoing,
the “bad apples” responsible could be identified and eliminated through care-
ful, rigorous analysis.  None of the states, of course, suggested that this cleans-
ing process would be easy.  In fact, the contrary is true; each of the state groups
expressed great concern that the data reflecting the arrests and treatment of
African Americans and Latinos could be used to prove too much.  There was a
danger, each of the states warned, that the data could unfairly besmirch the
reputations of men and women of true integrity, and it was important not to
draw unfounded conclusions even when the data at first glance raised questions
about the possible mistreatment of minority offenders.
To meet this danger, an unwritten presumption developed, a presumption of
fair treatment, which redounded collectively to the benefit of the official state
actors, without reflection upon whether any injustice was done in the process of
conferring that one-sided presumption to those not on its receiving end.135  With
the benefit of this presumption, it was not enough to show that African Ameri-
cans or Latinos were arrested disproportionately to whites, since all three of the
reports agreed that this was true.  Instead, it had to be shown that those dispari-
ties were the result of racial animus or prejudice.  It was not enough to show
that minority offenders were sentenced more harshly than non-minority offend-
ers, since both of the states that had sufficient data to reach a conclusion about
this found it to be true.  The data also needed to support the conclusion that
those disparities were due to improper racial or ethnic considerations rather
than some legitimate “legal” variable, such as differences in the offenders’
criminal histories or the gravity of the offenders’ crimes.
These points are not in and of themselves troublesome.  There is nothing
particularly offensive about the suggestion that an offender with several prior
offenses is more deserving of a prison term than an offender with none.  What is
troublesome is the suggestion that our concept of what it means to discriminate
is a neutral one.  Also troublesome is the suggestion that because a study shows
longer sentences are imposed upon certain offenders due to their greater
offense rates, their choice to traffic in certain kinds of controlled substances, or
the peculiar way in which the applicable sentencing guidelines channel the dis-
135. An example of this “presumption of fairness” and the state research groups’ reluctance to
malign too quickly the decisions of justice system personnel is found in the report issued by the Oregon
Working Group.  The Group wrote that even if it found that persons of color “experience[d] negative
outcomes in disproportionate numbers as they proceede[d] through the criminal justice system,” such a
finding would simply be “cause for added concern and further investigation.”  OREGON, supra note 6,
at ii.  Remedial action would be called for, the group noted, only after that “further investigation
uncovered unfair practices or policies.”  Id.  This passage reflects the very real pressures that are pres-
ent whenever a group of individuals is given the task of studying an issue as emotionally charged and
politically consequential as race.
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cretion of sentencing judges in such cases, then minority offenders are not being
discriminated against on the basis of their race or ethnicity.  The implicit sug-
gestion is that the rules under which offenders are being processed may have an
especially harsh impact on members of certain racial and ethnic groups, but
they are not discriminatory.
Seen in this light, the reports suffer, among other things, from the same
failing that the current judicial approach to anti-discrimination law does gener-
ally—an overly cabined understanding of what it means to discriminate against
members of a particular racial or ethnic group.  The studies are thus best read
and understood against a constitutional backdrop that legally recognizes dis-
crimination only when it is proved to be the work of intentionally racist actors.136
The quest of each of the states, then, was to rout from within their respective
systems any hidden racist actors, but the routing was undertaken with the
understanding that to qualify as “racist” one must be shown to harbor plainly
visible racial animus or discriminatory intent.  The quest embarked upon was
essentially the quest for a Grand Wizard, an unlikely find within the three state
criminal justice systems, not just because of the normally attendant problems of
proof that always make such a showing difficult, but because of a far more fun-
damental flaw in the concept of racism itself.
As other scholars have argued so well, if as yet unsuccessfully, unconscious
racism is a much bigger problem for modern America than the overt, out-in-
the-open racism of yesteryear.137 Overt racism is not dead, of course, but it has
been severely wounded, and it behaves as any other hunted and battle-scarred
animal would act, hiding in the shadows, conducting its business as quietly as
possible so as not to draw attention to itself.  Far from the express acts of offi-
cial racism that resulted in the Black Codes and legally mandated segregation
and laws against miscegenation of the past, white bigotry today is generally per-
ceived as immoral and reprehensible, something to be denied rather than
embraced.  Thus, attempts to expose the Grand Wizard, or to de-hood the
lurking racist players within state criminal justice systems, must be recognized
as misdirected from the start.  Such attempts fuel the suggestion that all racist
conduct is cut from the same cloth—a stark white sheet, sewn into a pointed
hood with holes cut away to provide the cloaked racist some measure of cow-
ardly anonymity.  In doing so, they divert our attention from the uncovering
and dispelling of the equally well-hidden and perhaps even more pernicious
forms of racism that will continue to haunt us so long as our eyes continue
myopically to search for those hated white hoods.
This contemporary concept of racial discrimination, marred by its hyper-
simplicity, is a noticeable undercurrent in each of the states’ analyses.  Each
report is framed against a backdrop of constitutional adjudication that absolves
136. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
137. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection, Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
DAVIES_FMT_2.DOC 05/29/03  10:09 AM
48 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:17
the states of any affirmative obligation of remedial action in the absence of
proof of intentional state discrimination.  If no such proof is forthcoming, even
rules or policies that have the demonstrable effect of solidifying racial dispari-
ties become challenge-proof.
